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Yackle: Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REQUIRE
DNA TESTING
Larry Yackle*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many states fail to conduct, or even to permit, DNA testing of
biological materials in circumstances in which the results might

exonerate convicts under sentence of death.' Senator Patrick Leahy
thinks that Congress should enact a statute requiring states to provide for
testing when it promises to reveal the truth. Leahy's idea is sensible as a
matter of policy. I mean in this Article to argue that it is also
constitutionally feasible.

Senator Leahy's specific proposal is contained in section 104 of the
Innocence Protection Act of 2001 ("IPA"):2
SEC. 104. PROHIBITION PURSUANT TO SECTION 5 OF THE
14TH AMENDMENT.
(a) Applicationfor DNA Testing.-No State shall deny an application

for DNA testing made by a prisoner in State custody who is under
sentence of death, if the proposed DNA testing has the scientific
- Professor of Law, Boston University. I should disclose that %%hileI did not draw th2 bill I
examine in this Article, I consulted on occasion with those vho did. Jack Becrmann, Ward
Farnsworth, Oona Hathaway, Avi Soifer, and Jeanette Yackle gave me helpful comments on an
earlier draft. Barry Scheck and Vanessa Potkin at the Innocence Project gave nv2 the benefits of
their thinking and research. Stan Fisher, Doug Laycock, and David Rossman answered questions for
me. Nicholas Vegliante helped with research.
Readers should not hold the editors of the Hofstra Lm Review responsible for d.eViations
from THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. cds.,
17th ed. 2000) on which I have insisted.
1. See JEREMY TRAVIS & CHRISTOPHER ASPLEN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, POSTCONVICTIO:
DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 10 (1999) (reporting that it is
unclear in many jurisdictions whether prisoners have any procedural means of demonstrating actual
innocence on the basis of newly discovered evidence advanced after conviction); see aiso infra
notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
2. S.486, 107th Cong. § 104(2001).
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potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence material to the
claim of the prisoner that the prisoner did not commit1) the offense for which the prisoner was sentenced to death; or
2) any other offense that a sentencing authority may have relied
upon when it sentenced the prisoner to death.
(b) Opportunity to Present Results of DNA Testing.-No State shall
rely upon a time limit or procedural default rule to deny a prisoner in
State custody who is under sentence of death an opportunity to present
in an appropriate State court new, noncumulative DNA results that
establish a reasonable probability that the prisoner did not commit an
offense described in subsection (a).
(c) Remedy.-A prisoner in State custody who is under sentence of
death may enforce subsections (a) and (b) in a civil action for
declaratory or injunctive relief, filed either in a State court of general
jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States, naming an
executive or judicial officer of the State as defendant.
(d) Finality Rule Unaffected.-An application under this section shall
not be considered an application for a writ of habeas corpus under
section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, for purposes of
determining whether it or any other application is a second or
successive application under section 2254.'

Most of the provisions in IPA can rest on congressional power to
place conditions on disbursements of federal treasure.4 This provision

cannot. Section 104 would not merely encourage states to act by offering
them monetary incentives It would order states to behave in a
prescribed way and would recruit the courts to enforce its commands.
Congressional power to regulate commerce among the states6 might be
the answer. Yet Senator Leahy has deliberately declined to lay the

groundwork for an argument along those lines.7 Moreover, he has
consciously omitted any clear textual indication that section 104 is
3. Id.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I.
5. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (explaining the "encouragement"
theory and its limits).
6. See U.S. CONST., art. I § 8, cl. 3.
7. Nothing in section 104 or in its legislative history indicates any purpose to rely on the
Commerce Clause. The Senate Judiciary Committee has taken no evidence tending to establish that
a state's refusal to provide for DNA testing in death penalty cases has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
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meant to achieve its goals by regulating things in commerce or, indeed,

commercial arrangements of any kind.8 In the current climate, that
omission would undermine an argument based on the commerce power
alone.' The reason that Senator Leahy has neglected the predicates for

anchoring section 104 in the spending and commerce powers is apparent
from the title line.'° This provision of IPA is meant to be an exercise of

the power conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce the provisions in Section 1 of that Amendment by "appropriate"
legislation." It is on that ground, and only on that ground, that I want to
defend its constitutionality.
The enforcement measures that Congress has attempted to justify
under Section 5 fall along a continuum. That continuum stretches from
statutes that raise no serious constitutional concerns at all, at one end, to
statutes that are invalid, at the other. 2 At the safe end of the spectrum lie
statutes that establish procedural machinery for implementing
interpretations that the Court itself has placed, or would place, on the
Fourteenth Amendment. Those judicial interpretations may be limited to
the explicit provisions in the Fourteenth Amendment: the Due Process,
8. Nothing in section 104 purports to reach state behavior indirectly by placing conditions on
the use of things that move in interstate commerce.
9. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (explaining that a federal criminal
statute will not be read to change the "federal-state balance" unless Congress consves that purpos:
"clearly"); see also Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs. 531 U.S. 159. 173
(2001) (invoking the Bass clear-statement rule in an environmental regulation setting).
10. See also S.486 § 101(b)(2) (2001) (stating that "the purposes of this title ar- to ...
prevent the imposition of unconstitutional punishments through the exercise of pavcr granted by
...[S]ection 5 of the [Fourteenth Amendment] to the Constitution of the United States").
11. U.S. CoN0ST. amend. XIV, § 5.
12. I put aside the question whether Section 5 empowers Congress to reach private behavior
not attributable to a state. During and immediately after Reconstruction, the Supreme Court %,as
notoriously unsympathetic to federal civil rights legislation. In the Civi Rihts Cases. 109 U.S. 3
(1883), the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 insofar as it purported to prohibit race
discrimination by inns, theaters, and other establishments operating under private proprietorship. In
United States v. Harris,106 U.S. 629 (1883). the Court equally invalidated the Civil Rights Act of
1871 insofar as it attempted to punish private interference with Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
Warren Court was infinitely more generous. In United States v. Guest. 383 U.S. 745 11965), a
majority of the Justices agreed that Congress could target private conduct after all. Nevertheless, the
current Court has embraced the Civil Rights Cases and Harris and has explicitly declined to be
impressed by the nose count in Guest. See United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S. 593. 624 02000).
Academics have mounted arguments that Section 5 empowers Congress to reach private behasior.
See e.g., Evan H. Caminker, PrivateRentediesfor Public 11rongs UnderSection 5, 33 LOY.LA. L
REv. 1351, 1359-60 (2000) (contending that the text of Section 5 might easily be read that %%ay);
Gary C. Leedes, State Action Limitations on Courts and CongressionalPower, 60 N.C. L RE%.
747, 796 (1982) (offering a more conservative thesis); see also Laurent B. Frantz. Congkressional
Power to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against PrivateActs, 73 YALE LI. 1353, 1381 !19641
(contending that congressional power to regulate private behavior %,ouldcomport with "original
understanding").
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Equal Protection, and Privileges or Immunities Clauses. 3 They may also

extend to other constitutional provisions that are "incorporated" by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 4 For example, Congress can confer jurisdiction
on federal courts to entertain suits arising under the Fourteenth

Amendment and can authorize private litigants to invoke that
jurisdiction. The common illustration is the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.

That statute contained both a section granting jurisdiction to federal
courts, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and a section authorizing

private suits relying on that jurisdiction, now codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 19836 Enactments at this end of the continuum may contain
substantive standards of behavior. But those standards merely rehearse
the content of judicially identified constitutional rights as the predicate

for establishing procedures for ensuring compliance with the Court's
precedents. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,"7 for example, the Court
sustained a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which

suspended literacy tests as a prerequisite for voting in certain southern
states. That decision can rest on the theory that the states affected had
used literacy tests to deny the franchise to African-Americans in
violation of the Court's account of the Fifteenth Amendment. 8
13. The Privileges or Immunities Clause has been largely neglected since the
Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). But in light of the Court's reliance on that
clause in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-03 (1999), Section 5 presumably empowers Congress to
enforce it along with its more familiar cousins.
14. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-19 (1997) (recognizing that Section 5
empowers Congress to enforce "incorporated" Bill of Rights safeguards).
15. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
and 42 U.S.C.).
16. The Court explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that the title to the 1871
Act explicitly stated that its purpose was to "enforce the provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]." Id. at 171. The Court has assumed not only that § 1983 was meant as a Section 5
enactment, but also that § 1983 is a valid enactment under this heading. In Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979), the Court entertained the argument that § 1983 abrogates state sovereign immunity
against suit by private litigants. See id. at 341. It was not so clear at that time, but it is quite clear
now (according to a five-member majority of the Justices), that Congress can override state
immunity only as a means of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment via Section 5. In Quern, the
underlying assumption was that if § 1983 were specific enough about it, it could eliminate state
immunity in cases to which it applies. Cf. Quern, 440 U.S. at 351 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that "[t]here is no question but that § 1983 was enacted by Congress under
[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). Section 5 statutes like § 1343(a)(3) and § 1983 are
uncontroversial. They might as easily rest on the power that Congress enjoys to establish inferior
federal courts and prescribe the business they will do within the boundaries fixed by Article III.
17. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
18. The enforcement authority conferred on Congress by Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment is understood to be coextensive with the power granted by Section 5 to enforce the
Fourteenth. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 n.8 (2001)
(explaining that the two enforcement clauses are "virtually identical"). The South Carolina case
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At the other end of the continuum lie federal statutes that purport to
diverge from the Court's interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There was a time, not so long ago, when statutes of this second kind also
counted as "appropriate" enforcement legislation. In Katzenbach v.

Morgan,'9 the Court acknowledged that it had previously held that the
Fourteenth Amendment allowed states to restrict the franchise to

residents who spoke English.2a Nevertheless, the Court sustained another
feature of the Voting Rights Act, which required states to allow Spanishspeaking people to vote. Statutes that redefine the substantive content of

Fourteenth Amendment rights have always troubled some members of
the Court. Justice Harlan dissented from the decision in Morgan.' In a

famous dissent in City of Rome v. United States,= then-Justice Rehnquist
insisted that Morgan could not support congressional power actually to

depart from the Court's interpretations.- Recently, the Chief Justice has
4 and again in United States r.
prevailed. In City, of Boerne v. Flores,z
Morrison,5 Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 6 College Savings Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary, Education Expense Board," and
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,23 the Court

denied that Section 5 grants Congress any power to determine that a

may have embraced a more generous scope for Section 5 power. I take this limited (and thus safer)
reading of the case from Justice Harlan. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 667 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
19. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
20. See id. at 649.
21. According to Justice Harlan, Morgan confused a decision about the meaning of the
Constitution (which Harlan regarded as for the Court to address) with a decision about an
appropriate remedial measure to "redress and prevent" a judicially-determined violation of the
Constitution (which he conceded to Congress). Id. at 666 (Harlan, J.. dissenting). Harlan charged
the Court with reaching an appealing result in Morgan at the cost of sacrificing fundamental
structural arrangements-both the "separation between the legislative and judicial function and the
boundaries between federal and state political authority." Id. at 659. Archibald Cox read one
"branch" of) the Morgan opinion to adopt the same "strikingly novel" rationale: "Congress can
invalidate state legislation upon the ground that it denies equal protection %,herethe Court vould
uphold, or even has upheld, the constitutionality of the same state statute." Archibald Cox.
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudicationand the Promotion ofHuuan Rihts. 80 KARV. L REv. 91,
106 (1966). By contrast to Harlan, Professor Cox regarded the idea that Congress could reach its
ovm independent interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment as "a happy innovation." Id.
22. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
23. See id. at 220 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
25. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
27. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
28. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
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state policy or activity is unconstitutional when the Court has concluded,
or would conclude, otherwise.29
Scattered along the continuum lie statutes that are remedial in a
substantive rather than in a procedural way. They do not merely
establish processes for vindicating judicially determined Fourteenth
Amendment rights; they prohibit local policies or activities, whatever
procedural arrangements are made to ensure that state authorities
comply. At the same time, these measures make no claim that the
behavior they prohibit violates the Fourteenth Amendment-as
conceived by Congress, if not the Court. They leave the content of
constitutional rights to the Court and proscribe ostensibly valid policies

or activities as a prophylactic means of forestalling behavior that does
offend the Court's account of the Fourteenth Amendment. In decisions
beginning with City of Boerne, the Court has held that Congress can
prohibit conduct that is not itself unconstitutional, so long as there is a

"congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional] injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."3

There is a case to be made that section 104 of IPA would fit neatly
at the safe end of the Section 5 spectrum. Arguably at least, this

provision would merely establish a procedural mechanism for ensuring
that states respect Fourteenth Amendment rights that the Supreme Court
29. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67; Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. These decisions should come as no
surprise. The five Justices who formed the majority in each instance plainly think that the Court
should aggressively enforce federalism limits on congressional power. They also recognize that the
state "sovereignty" limits they have identified do not control when Congress proceeds on the
authority provided by Section 5. Compare Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (refusing to
give effect to a federal statute purporting to subject the states to suits for damages as an exercise of
the commerce power), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (permitting Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity as an exercise of Section 5 power). It follows that those Justices
are likely to be careful about the Section 5 legislation they approve, lest they undermine their larger
campaign to maintain (better said, construct) federal/state arrangements they find satisfying. It may
even be true that the Justices in the majority are moved to take a restrictive view of Section 5 power
simply to fortify their related gambit in the immunity cases. But see infra Part I1. If the majority
Justices allow a commitment to immunity decisions, already insecure in their own right, to skew the
treatment of Section 5 power, they may precipitate repeated confrontations with the four dissenters,
who flatly refuse to accept the immunity decisions as valid precedent. See, e.g., Kimnel, 528 U.S. at
97-98 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). It is hard to think that the majority Justices, finding themselves in a
hole, will do their cause any good by digging deeper. On the general point that federalism can be
protected sufficiently through political means, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); HERBERT WECIISLER, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); cf. Jesse H. Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War
Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299, 341 (1982) (contending that political safeguards should suffice
to limit congressional power under Section 5 but anticipating the Court's resistance).
30. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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would recognize. That case is not impregnable, I confess. Yet at the very
least, it lays the groundwork for a stronger argument-namely, that
section 104 can be justified as a substantive remedial measure. My
primary objective is to show that if this provision targets conduct that
does not itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment, it can constitutionally
do so in order to forestall behavior that does. Section 104 would not
breach the limits on congressional Section 5 power by attempting to
substitute a legislative interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment for
an interpretation that the Supreme Court has announced or would adopt
inan appropriate setting.
II. SECTION 104 AS A PROCEDURAL DEVICE FOR ENFORCING
JUDICIALLY DECLARED RIGHTS

If section 104 is to be justified as a purely procedural device for
vindicating judicially articulated Fourteenth Amendment rights, two
things must be true. First, the substantive directions that subsections (a)
and (b) address to the states must track the Court's estimates of
constitutional meaning. Second, the lawsuits that subsection (c)
authorizes must redress only state conduct that violates the Court's
account of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Arguably at least, both those
things are true.
A.

Subsection (a)

Subsection (a) would bar a state from denying a death row
convict's request for DNA testing, provided the laboratory analysis
promises to "produce new, noncumulative evidence material to the
claim" that the prisoner "did not commit [the offense]."' The Supreme
Court has never held that the Fourteenth Amendment of its own force
imposes that limit on state prerogatives. Nor, I hasten to add, has the
Court ever held that a state can disallow postconviction DNA testing in
capital cases when it appears that a prisoner may well be innocent.
Nobody knows what the Court will say to the point in the future.
Congress must make a reasonable prediction on the basis of what the
Court has said in related contexts to date.
The precedents recognize that a state has constitutional obligations
to cooperate with convicts seeking to challenge their convictions. The
Court held in Ex parte HullF that a state cannot interfere with a
31. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486. 107th Cong. § 104(a) 120011.
32. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
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prisoner's attempt to file a postconviction petition in court and, in
Bounds v. Smith,33 that a state cannot deny a convict who has a plausible
claim access to a library or the services of someone trained in law. In the
main, the Court has recognized state constitutional duties of assistance at
antecedent stages of the criminal process. In the line of decisions
beginning with Brady v. Maryland,4 for example, the Court has held that
a state must disclose evidence helpful to the defense when it appears that
the evidence "is material in the sense that its suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial."3 Evidence meets the test of
"materiality" if it establishes a "reasonable probability" of acquittal. 6
None of these cases conclusively answers the question whether the
Constitution requires a state to allow postconviction DNA testing. The
Brady rule governs state behavior before a conviction is obtained (not
after) and obligates a state to disclose evidence that is by nature
"favorable" to the defense (not materials that may be exculpating
depending on the results of laboratory tests)." Nevertheless, once it is
conceded that, prior to trial, a state must disclose evidence that would
probably produce an acquittal, it is no long step to the proposition that,
after conviction, a state must permit a prisoner to test objects for DNA
evidence that may disprove his guilt altogether.38
Subsection (a) is extremely limited.39 This provision would not
require a state itself to conduct DNA tests. It would not require a state to
make the results of any tests it chooses to conduct available to the
prisoner, and it would not require a state to pay for tests that the prisoner
arranges for himself. Read literally, subsection (a) would not even
require a state to preserve items for the purpose of testing." This
provision would merely require a state to give a prisoner the opportunity
to secure DNA testing of available objects at his or her own expense.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

430 U.S. 817 (1977).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
See id. at 281-82.

38. See Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (reasoning that Brady and
other Supreme Court decisions invite the understanding that due process requires a state to permit
postconviction DNA testing in at least some circumstances). In Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343
(1996), the Court disclaimed anything in Bounds suggesting that a state has a duty to help a prisoner
"discover" a claim for postconviction relief of which the prisoner is not already aware. See id. at
354. In that case, however, the Court was plainly attempting to circumscribe a state's responsibility
to supply prison inmates with law libraries. It may be that most prisoners can make little use of
professional books. The same cannot be said of DNA evidence.
39. See Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 104(a) (2001).
40. But see infra note 118.
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Importantly, subsection (a) would only require a state to allow testing
that has the "potential" to produce new evidence "material" to a

prisoner's claim of innocence. That test of "materiality" incorporates the
corresponding element of the Court's Brady doctrine. To be sure,
subsection (a) does not simply reiterate Brady, which requires a state to
cooperate only if evidence actually is material.4' Yet by conditioning the
state's obligation to allow testing on the prospect that testing will

generate material evidence, subsection (a) comes as close as it can to
Brady in these circumstances. In actual Brady cases, courts are presented

with the very evidence that the prosecution failed to disclose and are
thus in a position to decide whether it is material. In the cases to which

subsection (a) is addressed, courts must necessarily determine only the
potentialthat DNA testing will produce evidence that is material in the
Brady sense that it establishes a reasonable probability that the prisoner

is innocent.42 This provision would require a prisoner to lay a foundation
for his or her request. There would have to be tangible objects to test,

and those objects would have to bear genuine "exculpatory potential.' '
Ordinarily, it is no great imposition to give a prisoner access to
things in the state's possession. I have to think that most states would

probably do so if they paused to consider the matter seriously. If a state
declines to cooperate, the most likely explanation is not that the state has

deliberated the pros and cons and reached a decision that testing is
generally a bad idea, but rather that the state has simply failed to
formulate a procedure for processing requests." That is what stands in
41. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
42. Subsection (a) does not explicitly define "material" evidence as evidence that creates a
"reasonable probability" that the prisoner is innocent. That is inconsequential. The Court itzclf has
given "materiality" that meaning, and a new statute can simply incorporate the same definition by
using the term to which it is attached. Moreover, the omission of any reference to "reasonabLe
probability" from subsection (a) is a product of stylistic drafting changes. A previous version of
subsection (a), included in the Innocence Protection Act of 2000, S. 2690, 106th Cong. § 104
(2000), would have required a state to allow testing of anything in its possession related to a
prisoner's case, but then would have permitted a state to refuse to allow testing that a judge
determined could not produce evidence establishing a "reasonable probability" that the prisonzr was
innocent. In its current form, subsection (a) merges the two ideas that its predecessor treated
separately. It abandons any blanket requirement that testing always be allowed and thus dispenses
with any need to qualify such a blanket requirement. Instead, subsection (a) makes the state's initial
obligation turn on the potential that testing will produce material evidence, which is to say, evidence
establishing a reasonable probability that the prisoner is innocent. In addition, subsection (b)
explicitly prescribes a "reasonable probability" standard to govern a prisoner's entitlement to
present favorable test results to a state court. That, too, is perfectly consistent with the palicy of
adhering to the Court's extant doctrines as closely as possible.
43. Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
44. Some state forensic laboratories are overwhelmed by requests for DNA testing from
prosecutors who want to use the results as evidence against criminal defendants. See Ralph Ranalli,
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the way of postconviction DNA testing that could correct a monstrous
injustice. As a practical matter, subsection (a) would not force a state to
abandon a reasoned policy of resistance to DNA testing, but would only
require the state to focus on these problems. I would not argue that the

Supreme Court is especially sensitive to prisoners' claims that they did
not commit the dreadful crimes of which they were convicted. But I
would not want to think that the Court would allow a state's oversight or
bureaucratic indifference to keep a death row prisoner from testing
objects on the state's storage shelves for DNA evidence that could prove

that the prisoner was not the perpetrator (and help identify the person
who was).45 Ordinarily, the Court may doubt the value of asking a state
to indulge a prisoner's attempts to reexamine evidence that has already
led to a valid conviction. But a request for DNA testing that was not
previously available is another matter entirely. The great dispositive
power of DNA evidence is unique and warrants a special response.46
B. Subsection (b)
Subsection (b) bars a state from relying on a "time limit" or other
"procedural default rule" to deny a prisoner's request to present
exculpatory DNA test results to a state court. The Supreme Court has
never held that the Fourteenth Amendment itself disallows procedural
bar rules of that order. Nor has the Court held that a state can close its
courts to a powerful showing of innocence, thus leaving a prisoner to the
DNA Labs Swamped in Backlog of Tests, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 28, 2001, at B4. Presumably, then,
it would be hard for some state labs also to run tests at the request of prisoners who have already
been convicted. But subsection (a) would not make that demand of public facilities. This provision
would only require state authorities to establish procedures for making objects available to private
labs for testing arranged by prisoners themselves. Certainly, subsection (a) would permit a state to
insist on reasonable precautions for ensuring the integrity of anything released for testing.
45. The prisoner in Dabbs asked only that a rape victim's clothing, a gauze pad, and "rape test
slides" containing semen be subjected to DNA testing to determine whether the prisoner was the
donor. See Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 768. The court ordered that testing despite the prisoner's
otherwise unchallenged conviction. The tests showed that the prisoner's DNA did not match the
DNA on the victim's clothing. See People v. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90,92 (Sup. Ct. 1991). On that
basis, the court vacated the conviction. See id. at 93; cf. Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (pointing out that DNA test results obliterated the prosecution's theory of the case
against the prisoner). If by contrast, DNA evidence could not undermine a prisoner's guilt, testing
would not be required. See Lyon v. Senkowski, 109 F. Supp. 2d 125, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)
(explaining that a federal habeas petitioner's conviction for felony murder would not be affected by
DNA test results showing that he had not physically assaulted the victim).
46. See Harvey v. Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a state's
refusal to give a convict "access to possibly exculpatory [DNA] evidence states a claim of denial of
due process").
47. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 104(b) (2001).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol29/iss4/8

10

Yackle: Congressional Power to Require DNA Testing
20011

CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REQUIRE DNA TESTING

mercies of executive clemency. Here again, Congress must anticipate the
Court's views in light of the relevant precedents now in place.
The Fourteenth Amendment obviously is concerned with actual
innocence. The principal purpose of most federal procedural safeguards
in criminal cases is to ensure that "guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer."' The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment insists
upon a fair trial not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end-the end
of sorting the innocent from the guilty.' 9 Most of the "incorporated"
safeguards in the Bill of Rights similarly serve the basic truth-seeking
function.' A federal statute requiring state courts to consider exonerating
DNA test results would thus be in tune with the underlying objectives of
the federal constitutional procedural standards the Court has elaborated
for criminal cases.
In this instance, subsection (b), like subsection (a), consciously
follows the Brady doctrine as nearly as possible. Subsection (b) comes
into play after DNA testing has been performed and a prisoner contends
that the results are favorable. At that point, a state procedural rule may
formally bar access to state court. Importantly, subsection (b) does not
set aside rules of that kind en masse, but creates only a modest and
sensible exception: A prisoner must be permitted access to a state court
to advance new evidence establishing a reasonable probability that he or
she is innocent. That "reasonable probability" standard comes directly
from the Brady line of decisions. Accordingly, subsection (b) would
merely require a state to relax its normal procedural requirements
enough to allow a prisoner to present to a state court the very kind of
evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment bars the state from
withholding from such a court. A statutory requirement of that sort
arguably operates merely as a procedural device for implementing the
Supreme Court's principles, albeit in a different context.
Nevertheless, most precedents understand the Constitution chiefly
to protect innocent people indirectly-by demanding that criminal
prosecutions adhere to federal procedural safeguards meant to avoid
erroneous convictions in the first place. The Court made this point in
Herrera v. Collins.' The prisoner in that case sought federal habeas
48. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
49. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (explaining that the point of a trial is to
determine whether the prosecution can overcome the presumption that a defendant is innaecnt.
50. See generally OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY. REPORT To TIlE ATTOP.;EY GE;EtAL O,;
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUs REVIEv OF STATE JUDGMENTS: "TRUTt WU
CPdMIt1LJVS'TICV"R.EPiIT
No. 7 (1988) (discussing the debate over the investigative stages of the criminal justice prezess.,
reprintedin 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901 (1989).
51. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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corpus relief on the ground that new evidence demonstrated his
innocence. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that
a claim of actual innocence advanced after a defendant has been
convicted ordinarily alleges no constitutional violation."2 Concomitantly,
the Chief Justice explained that a state ordinarily can refuse to consider
newly discovered evidence related to innocence after a fixed period of
time following trial. Once convicted, a prisoner is no longer presumed
innocent, but rather is deemed to be guilty. By hypothesis, society has
marshaled considerable resources at trial in an effort to achieve an
accurate verdict. That verdict is entitled to respect, unless the prisoner
can demonstrate some procedural irregularity that undermines
confidence in the outcome. 3 It is disruptive and inefficient to
countenance a belated post-trial attempt essentially to revisit the very
question the trial was conducted to decide. In Herrera itself, the prisoner
offered affidavits indicating that another man had committed the
murders for which the prisoner had been convicted. Chief Justice
Rehnquist explained that if evidence of that kind were entertained in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding long after trial, the federal court would
be forced both to determine the reliability and weight of the new
evidence and to compare that evidence to the proof at trial.' That
enterprise, in turn, might require the court to call the trial witnesses back
for a hearing and, in the end, to reproduce the fact-finding function of
the original prosecution in state court-at a time when much of the
information to be digested might be stale and memories dim."
If Chief Justice Rehnquist had stopped after providing this
explanation of the way the Fourteenth Amendment works, the outlook
for subsection (b) would obviously be open to question. But the Chief
Justice did not stop. Having laid out the way in which the Constitution
deals with ordinary cases, he explicitly acknowledged the possibility that
a showing of actual innocence might implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment in an extraordinary case, even if unaccompanied by any
claim of procedural irregularity. Specifically, he said:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case, that
in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual innocence"
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant

52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 404.
See id. at 399-411.
See id. at 396, 402.
Seeid. at402-03,416-18.
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unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no

state avenue open to process such a claim.!"
A federal court can issue habeas corpus relief only if a prisoner is in
custody in violation of federal law, typically the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 Accordingly, this statement in Herrera must have
contemplated one or more propositions of federal constitutional law. I
count at least three possibilities. First, it may be unconstitutional for a
state to execute an innocent person. Second, it may be unconstitutional
for a state to execute a person who was validly convicted but
demonstrates thereafter that he is innocent. Third, it may be
unconstitutional for a state to refuse to open its courts to a convincing
"actual innocence" showing, made after the time for post-trial motions
has expired.
The Chief Justice did not formally take a position on any of these
propositions. I want to be clear about that. It is possible to argue that he
only meant to say that he would have reached the same conclusion in
Herrera,even accepting the prisoner's doubtful premise that a "truly
persuasive" demonstration of "actual innocence" would state a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. If that is what he meant, then the
assumption he adopted for purposes of argument may have been a "feel
good" concluding remark calculated to reassure the rest of us that the
petitioner had not been treated unjustly. ' That, however, is not the only
interpretation that the statement I have quoted can bear.
All the Justices in Herrera took Chief Justice Rehnquist's
assumption arguendo very seriously. 9 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter dissented from the judgment turning the prisoner away!" They
insisted that Rehnquist's explanation of why "innocence" claims are
usually insufficient was "dictum" in light of his stated assumption that a
"truly persuasive" showing would state a Fourteenth Amendment
violation.6' Justice White concurred only in the judgment. He endorsed
the assumption that the Chief Justice articulated and explained his
position entirely on the ground that the prisoner in Herrera had not
offered sufficient proof that he was actually innocent!2 Justices
56. Id. at 417.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994).
58. Ward Farnsworth suggested this reading to me.
59. See Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: 77te
Gateivay of Innocence for Death.Scnienecd
PrisonersLeads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 1003-09 (1994) (noting that only Justices
Scalia and Thomas were "cavalier" regarding "actual innocence" claims).
60. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun. L,dissentingjoined by Stevens & Souter. JJ. .
61. See id.
62. See id. at429 (White, J., concurring in thejudgmznt).
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O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in everything the Chief Justice said
regarding most "actual innocence" claims. Yet they devoted the lion's
share of their opinion to an argument that the prisoner in Herrera was
guilty and thus did not present for decision the question whether a
powerful demonstration of actual innocence, advanced after trial, would
state a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 63 O'Connor and Kennedy
concluded that discussion with a warning that federal courts might be
deluged by "actual innocence" claims "[u]nless federal proceedings and
relief-if they are to be had at all-are reserved for 'extraordinarily
high' and 'truly persuasive demonstration[s] of 'actual innocence"' that
the state courts will not consider. 6 That suggested both that O'Connor
and Kennedy were nervous about "actual innocence" cases and that they
were unwilling to disclaim them altogether. Justices Scalia and Thomas,
who did renounce "actual innocence" claims entirely, insisted that it was
unlikely that "evidence ... as convincing as today's opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon."'6 That, too, indicated that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption arguendo was a serious part of the
analysis in Herrera.
Taken together, the opinions filed in Herrera make the Justices'
thinking regarding the first proposition pretty clear. The Court would
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to bar a state from executing an
innocent person. Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption arguendo lends
support to this conclusion, as does Justice White's endorsement. Beyond
that, five other Justices made more decisive statements in their own
separate opinions. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter said
forthrightly that it would violate both the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Eighth Amendment to "execute a person who is actually innocent.""
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy said that they could not "disagree" that
"the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a
constitutionally intolerable event." 67 Only Justices Scalia and Thomas

63. See id. at 421-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.).
64. Id. at 426 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.). Susan Bandes has
developed the substantive due process and cruel-and-unusual-punishment arguments. See Susan
Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV.
501,503 (1996).
67. Herrera,506 U.S. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.); see Carriger
v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concluding that this resulting majority of
the Justices "would have" held "explicitly" that the "execution of an innocent person would violate
the Constitution").
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declared that the Constitution would permit a state to put a person to
death despite powerful evidence that the prisoner is innocent.rs
This result may seem unsurprising. Yet it does represent an
advancement beyond the conventional story that the Constitution
ordinarily protects the innocent by establishing procedures for obtaining
accurate judgments. The understanding that the Court interprets the
Fourteenth Amendment to accommodate demonstrations of "actual
innocence" (albeit in exceptional circumstances) bears on the argument I
am now making-namely, that section 104 is a valid procedural remedy
for judicially identified Fourteenth Amendment rights. This account of
the Court's views is more telling with respect to the argument I All
make later-namely, that section 104 is a valid substantive prophylactic
mechanism for preventing Fourteenth Amendment violations!'
The record is less clear regarding the second proposition I have
identified. Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption arguendo explicitly
refers to the possibility that a showing of innocence "made after trial"
would render an execution unconstitutional. Justice White contemplated
the same idea.70 For their part, Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter
embraced the proposition that "the Constitution forbids the execution of
a person who has been validly convicted" but nonetheless "can prove his
innocence with newly discovered evidence."7 ' Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy were comparatively reserved. They insisted that the evidence
was so weak in Herrera that there was no need to decide whether a
"fairly convicted and therefore legally guilty person" is constitutionally
entitled to a hearing on the basis of persuasive new evidence? Justices
Scalia and Thomas declared that, after a valid conviction has been
obtained, a state can rely entirely on clemency to avoid an erroneous
execution.?
Notwithstanding the resulting ambiguity, there is a basis for
predicting that, if pressed, a majority of the Justices would say that a
valid conviction does not always satisfy the Constitution. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy scarcely dismissed this second proposition.
68. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 427-28 (Scalia, J.. concurring, joined by Thomas. J.) Scalia and
Thomas noted that prisoners who prove their innocence will typically receive a pardon. Sce id. at
428. A denial of executive clemency ordinarily does not implicate the Due Process Clause and thus
is not subject to judicial review. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat. 452 U.S. 458.467 (1931

(holding that convicts have no liberty interest in the commutation of a sentence.
69. See infra Part ilL

concurring in the judgment}.
70. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 429 (White, J.,
71. Id. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Souter.JJ.).
72. Id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.).
73. See id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas. J.).
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They described it as "sensitive" and "troubling" and thus recognized that
it warrants serious attention in a proper case. 4 Moreover, it's difficult in
all candor to fathom how O'Connor and Kennedy could subscribe to the
first proposition (that the Constitution does not permit a state to execute
a "legally and factually" innocent person) without also conceding the
second." It is possible (just possible) that when they agreed that a
"legally and factually" innocent person cannot be put to death, they were
thinking of a person who has not received a trial at all or even a person
who has been tried and acquitted. But if that is the kind of person they
had in mind, query why they were so cautious. Recall that they said that
they could "not disagree" that the Constitution would bar an execution in
those circumstances. Nobody should have to dig very deep into his
professional (not to say moral) reserves to conclude that the Constitution
prohibits the execution of someone whose legal guilt has not been
established. Since Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were so tentative
with respect to a proposition that should have engaged no controversy at
all, it may be that, even then, they were looking ahead to the next
proposition, which in their minds raised a more troubling issue. When
those two key members of the Court ultimately face the question
whether the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to execute a convict
who proves his actual innocence, I have to think that they will hold that
it does not.
The record is less clear still regarding the third proposition: It
would be unconstitutional for a state to close its courts' doors to a posttrial showing of actual innocence after a filing deadline has passed.
There are circumstances in which the Fourteenth Amendment obligates a
state court to entertain a federal claim.76 Yet in a series of other cases, the
Court has said that the Constitution typically does not require a state to
provide either appellate or postconviction avenues for attacking criminal
convictions." Those cases suggest that a state might refuse to give a
convict any post-trial opportunity at all to proffer new evidence going to

74. Id. at 421 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.).
75. As Vivian Berger has pointed out, "[t]he abstract substantive right to avoid execution if
innocent means nothing in concrete terms ...unless there exists a correlative right to establish
innocence before a court at a requisite level of probability-and to do so after judgment." Berger,
supra note 59, at 1012.
76. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 393-94 (1964) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state court hearing on the voluntariness of a confession).
77. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (declaring that a state has no
constitutional obligation to offer convicts an opportunity to seek appellate review of criminal
judgments); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (indicating that state
postconviction procedures are also discretionary).
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innocence and afortiorithat a state could open its courts only for a fixed
period of time. Then again, to judge from still other reports, Congress
has no constitutional obligation to maintain postconviction federal
habeas, either.'8 Nevertheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption
arguendo in Herreracontemplates that a federal court can grant "relief'
if a state court is unavailable:7 That, in turn, must conceive some basis
for a federal court judgment that a prisoner is in custody in violation of
federal law. The most likely basis for such a judgment is that the state
concerned violates the Fourteenth Amendment if its courts decline to
look at a convincing showing of actual innocence at the postconviction
Stagee.

The separate opinions in Herreraare of limited help regarding the
third proposition. Justice White did not specify the court that he assumed
would entertain a post-trial demonstration of innocence!" Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter focused on access to federal habeas
corpus and did not discuss the possibility that the states might have a
constitutional duty to open their own courts." Justices Scalia and
Thomas also conceived that "actual innocence" claims would reach (and
swamp) federal habeas courts." Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
expressed the same concern."a Yet they also provided some support for
the view that state courts must be open. Specifically, they explained that
the Texas courts "would not be free to turn petitioner away if the
Constitution required othenvise.' ' In Herreraitself, the Constitution did
Ywt require otherwise. But that was because the petitioner sought relief a

78. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring). This point
noted, I hasten to say that there are arguments to the effect that federal habeas corpus is
constitutionally obligatory in some instances. See LARRY NV.YACKLE. FEnRAL COURTS 419-22

(1999).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
80. Judge Jolly properly notes that Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed arguendo that a shaoing
of innocence may state a constitutional violation only if there is no "state avenue" for processing th:
claim. See Lucas v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1998) (Jolly. 1.). Yet Judge Jolly is
wrong to think that executive clemency can supply such a "state avenue." The other Justices in
Herrera plainly understood the Chief Justice to contemplate a state judicial prceeding. See

Herrera,506 U.S. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.); see id. at 428 IScalia,
J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.); see id. at 439-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens
& Souter, JJ.).

81. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 429 (white, J., concurring in the judgment).
82. See id. at 441 (Blacknun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Souter. JJ.) Ireferring to
state courts only to acknowledge that state processes ordinarily must b.- exhausted before
adjudication in federal court can begin).

83. See id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.).
84. See id. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Kennedy, 1.).

85. Id. at 425.
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full eight years after the state deadline and, at that point, offered
evidence that O'Connor and Kennedy regarded as weak.86

In the absence of more guidance from the Court, I think Congress
may sensibly conclude that a state court cannot disregard a "truly

persuasive" demonstration of innocence simply because it is advanced
after conviction. If the Court holds that the Fourteenth Amendment
entitles a prisoner to some postconviction judicial opportunity to make
that kind of showing, it is hard to think the Court would hold that a state

court can box him or her off on procedural grounds and leave the matter
entirely to federal habeas corpus. A demonstration of innocence based
on new evidence is quintessentially the kind of thing that must be

addressed after a valid conviction is in place. When a prisoner develops
evidence of that caliber, it makes sense to say that a state court must be

willing to examine it."
A DNA case may be the "actual innocence" paradigm. A convict

who virtually eliminates the possibility that he or she was the perpetrator
makes a "truly persuasive" demonstration of innocence about as well as
anyone could. Moreover, a case in which a prisoner can show actual

innocence on the basis of DNA evidence is easier to manage than a case
like Herrera,in which the prisoner relied on traditional evidence in the

form of affidavits that might be countered. The standard that subsection
(b) requires prisoners to meet tracks neatly with the Court's precedents.
Recall that a prisoner is entitled to present to a state court only test
results that satisfy the Brady test for materiality, that is, results that
establish a "reasonable probability" that the prisoner is innocent. That

"reasonable probability" test, in turn, is a fair approximation of the

86. See id. at 423.
87. In this vein, consider that Chief Justice Rehnquist declined Justice Blackmun's invitation
to treat the petitioner's claim under the heading of substantive due process. See id. at 407 n.6.
Instead, the Chief Justice insisted that the question was not whether the Due Process Clause bars the
execution of an innocent person, "but rather whether it entitles petitioner to judicial review of his
,actual innocence' claim." Id. Vivian Berger has argued that the Court should hold that a death.
sentenced prisoner who asserts his or her innocence on the basis of newly discovered evidence is
constitutionally entitled to file a postconviction motion in state court at any time, notwithstanding
any filing deadline governing ordinary post-trial motions. See Berger, supra note 59, at 949.
There is, of course, the possibility that defense counsel may have "sandbagged" the state
trial court. If the prosecution did not arrange for DNA testing, if there was a chance that the jury
would acquit without DNA evidence against the defendant, and if there was a risk that testing would
actually produce unfavorable results, defense counsel may have waited to request testing until after
a conviction was returned, when the risk of generating damning evidence was mooted. Stories of
defense counsel manipulating events for strategic advantage are hard to believe in any context.
fanciful in this one. Sensible defense attorneys try their level best to avoid convictions, knowing full
well that if their clients are found guilty the chances of changing that result are remote for a host of
reasons, known and unforeseeable.
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standard to which Chief Justice Rehnquist referred in Herrera.There is
little to choose between "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual
innocence,"' on the one hand, and evidence that establishes a
"reasonable probability" of actual innocence, on the other. Congress can
hardly be faulted for choosing the latter phraseology and thus capturing
the working ideas in both Brady and the Herrera assumption arguendo.?
Accordingly, section 104 can be defended as a procedural device for
enforcing a Fourteenth Amendment right that the Justices have not yet
acknowledged, but would recognize in a proper setting.
There is a way, moreover, in which section 104 requires a state to
act in far fewer instances than the Court arguably assumed the
Constitution demands. Both subsection (a) and subsection (b) are limited
to cases in which the prisoner seeking DNA testing is under sentence of
death. The petitioner in Herrerawas also condemned to die. For that
reason, the Court focused its attention on demonstrations of innocence
offered by prisoners on death row. Nevertheless, the Court recognized
that if an extremely strong showing of actual innocence states a
Fourteenth Amendment violation in a capital case, it also must do so in a
non-capital case.9" Section 104 would therefore consciously underenforce the constitutional right that the Court arguably assumed to exist
88. Herrera,506 U.S. at 417.
89. Nor can Congress be faulted for declining to lift a standard from one of the Fzparate
opinions in Herrera.Justice White proposed that the Court should borrow the standard established
in Jackson r. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). According to White, a prisoner in these circumstances
should "at the very least be required to show that based on proffered newly discovered evidence and
the entire record... 'no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Herrera,506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) quoting
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). If a majority of the Justices had thought that Jackson was apt. Chief
Justice Rehnquist presumably would have employed that familiar standard in his assumption
arguendo. He did not, and Justice White had to intetject Jackson for himself. Justice Blackmun, for
his part, explicitly disclaimed the Jackson standard. See id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined
by Stevens & Souter, JJ.). Blackrnun proposed, instead, that a prisoner should be required to show
that he "probably is innocent." Id. at 442. He explained that a simple "probability" standard vould
occupy a happy middle ground between Jackson and the standard the Court has employed in its
decisions on procedural default. According to Blackmun, a prisoner should not be required to prove
his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt, but should be required to do more than meresl ra-e
doubts about his guilt. A requirement that he or she prove probable innocence fits that bill. Se id. at
442-43 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986) and McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
494 (1991)). Just as the Chief Justice failed to endorse Justice White's proposal, he equally failed to
embrace Justice Blackmun's alternative. If, then, Congress were simply to codify Blckmun's View
in Herrera,it would risk a conflict with the Justices who did not join his opinion-Justices %ho,
after all, form the majority. By insisting that a prisoner prove a "rasonable probability" of
innocence (rather than simply a "probability"), subsection (b) hopes to avoid that eventuality.
90. See Herrera,506 U.S. at 405 (explaining that "lilt would be a rather strange jurisprudetnze
... which held that under our Constitution [a death row convict] could not be executed, but that he
could spend the rest of his life in prison").
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for purposes of deciding Herrera. This provision would impose
obligations on a state only in death penalty cases, when it appears that
the Fourteenth Amendment itself may impose those same obligations in
capital and non-capital cases alike.
Subsection (b) is not vulnerable to constitutional attack simply
because Herrera rejected a single prisoner's claim and upheld filing
deadlines generally. By contrast, there is a good argument that
subsection (b) is peculiarly appropriate as a legislative attempt to grapple
with a constitutional problem that current law does not handle well. The
Herreraopinion described the difficulties that "actual innocence" claims
present in federal habeas corpus and relied in some measure on those
difficulties for its statement that only a strong demonstration of
innocence could be cognizable. Still, the Justices acknowledged that
cases raising a sufficiently powerful showing may come along. Having
been warned by the Court that "actual innocence" cases will arise and
present difficulties if they must be adjudicated in federal habeas corpus,
Congress may enact a statute that anticipates those cases and provides
for addressing them in state court. 9'
C. Subsection (c)
Finally, subsection (c) is a straightforward right-of-action provision
authorizing prisoners to sue in either state or federal court for
declaratory or injunctive relief from a state's failure to comply with
subsections (a) and (b).9 Federal district courts would have jurisdiction
to entertain those suits either under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) or under the
general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. If
subsections (a) and (b) would be appropriate remedial measures under
Section 5, it must follow that subsection (c) would also be valid. It
would authorize the most traditional means by which legal standards
may be implemented-private lawsuits seeking orders requiring state
officers to conform their behavior to law. Subsection (c) would only
91. Vivian Berger has developed the case for preferring the state courts for handling cases of
this kind. See Berger, supranote 59, at 1009-22. Susan Bandes insists that it is not crucial whether a
hearing on newly discovered evidence going to innocence is held in federal or state court, so long as
it is held "in some court." Bandes, supranote 66, at 522. But she admits a preference for the federal
forum. See id. at 523-25. For illustrations of the difficulties that beset federal court attempts to
grapple with DNA cases, see Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 770-74 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(explaining an injunction requiring state authorities to make physical items available for testing at a
private laboratory), appeal dismissed,258 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2001); Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d

967, 970-71 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (explaining a decision to grant a prisoner's request for testing
pursuant to the discovery rules governing habeas corpus proceedings).
92. See Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 104(c) (2001).
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accomplish in this particular context what § 1983 achieves for
Fourteenth Amendment claims generally.93 Importantly, subsection (c)
would not empower a federal court itself to entertain a showing of actual
innocence based on DNA testing results. This provision would only

authorize a prisoner to file a lawsuit in federal court (or state court),
seeking an order enforcing subsections (a) and (b)-that is, the

requirements that the state must allow testing and an opportunity to
present favorable results to a state court. Subsection (c) would leave it to

that state court both to determine the merits of an "actual innocence"
claim and to fashion appropriate relief, if warranted."
If section 104 is properly anchored in Section 5, Congress would

have power to subject a state itself to suit.5 Subsection (c) takes the
more familiar route of authorizing officer suits against state agents.'
There is something important in that. The Court's recent decisions
regarding the scope of Section 5 place limits on various kinds of federal
legislation. Yet Justice Kennedy, who made the difference in most of

those cases, is primarily concerned with statutes that authorize private
claims against state treasuries. It is when Congress purports to abrogate

state sovereign immunity from private suits for compensatory damages
that Justice Kennedy sits up and takes notice. 7 Why this should be so is

puzzling, to be sure.93 For present purposes, it is enough simply to say
93. Subsection (c) specifies that either an executive or a judicial officer may be named as
defendant. That marks a minor difference between the civil actions this subsection would authorize
and the suits that § 1983 makes possible. Pursuant to an amendment to § 1983 in 1996, state judicial
officers are immune from § 1983 suits for injunctive relief unless they first violate a declaratory
judgment or declaratory relief is unavailable. Cf. Pulliam v. Allen. 466 U.S. 522. 527 11934)
(superseded in this respect by the 1996 amendment). The immunity granted to state judicial officers
in § 1983 actions is entirely a matter of nonconstitutional law and can be abandoned in this context,
where it makes sense to authorize prisoners seeking to enforce subsections (a) and (bj to pursue
immediate coercive orders addressed to recalcitrant statejudges.
94. Subject, of course, to direct review in the United States Supreme Court if a federal issue
proves decisive.
95. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
96. See generally Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955. 963 n.9 (2001)
(explaining that officer suits can be maintained even when Congress has not successfully abrogated
a state's sovereign immunity); Ex porte Young, 209 U.S. 123. 166 (1903) (explaining that private
litigants can sue state officers for injunctive orders requiring officers to take action on behalf of the
states they serve).
97. See, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court's
decision invalidating a congressional attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity against private
damages actions to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") did not affect a state's
threshold obligation to comply with the Act insofar as its substantive standards could be sustained
under the Commerce Clause).
98. It passes understanding why anyone would think that the Constitution is perfectly content
when private litigants summon judicial power to coerce state officers into compliance with federal
statutory standards or when the United States itself makes claims on a state's treasury, but that
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that subsection (c) would not expose state budgets to private lawsuits.

This provision would authorize only suits naming state officers as
defendants and seeking only forward-looking declaratory or injunctive
remedies. 9' By implication, subsection (c) would foreclose suits for
backward-looking compensatory relief.
III. SECTION 104 AS A PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE FOR PREVENTING
VIOLATIONS OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS

If section 104 does not simply provide a procedural mechanism for
implementing judicially articulated Fourteenth Amendment rights, this
provision is still valid as a substantive prophylactic measure. A state's
denial of DNA testing or an opportunity to present favorable testing
results to a state tribunal need not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress can require states to allow both testing and a chance to present
the results as a means of forestalling what would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment-either foreclosing extremely strong demonstrations of
innocence on the ground that they are out of time or, certainly, actually
executing innocent people. To withstand challenge on this ground,

section 104 must be "congruent" and "proportional" within the meaning
of the Court's recent decisions.
A.

The "Congruence and Proportionality"Test

The Court has yet to develop a full account of "congruence" and
"proportionality." Robert Post and Reva Siegel take the two
federalism is fundamentally upset when private parties seek even modest compensation for admitted
state violations of federal law. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (Kennedy, J.)
(declaring that a state is constitutionally immune from a private suit for damages but not from a
private suit for another form of relief or from a suit by the United States). Yet that is precisely what
Justice Kennedy does think and, for the moment, he is in a position to make his view the
constitutional law of the land. Of course, the concern that legislation enacted by Congress may
interfere with state budgetary decisions runs through the Court's federalism decisions from Edelman
v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651, 676 (1974), through NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985),

and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), to Alden and other more recent immunity
cases, See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. That thread has drawn its share of academic attention and
criticism. It is bad economics at best. There is no serious argument that the forward-looking
injunctive relief the Court (routinely) permits interferes with a state's capacity to make budgetary
decisions any less than does the backward-looking compensatory relief the Court (sometimes)
forbids. For my own part, I see no constitutional warrant for the Court's efforts to spare the states
the costs of defying federal law, far less a workable doctrinal basis for protecting state assets in
some contexts and not in others.
99. For this same reason, subsection (b) would raise no immunity problem simply because it
contemplates a state court duty to entertain a strong showing of actual innocence.
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requirements in combination to establish a single "test" for judging the
constitutionality of legislation under Section 5.'0 They assimilate that

test, in turn, to the Court's familiar "narrow tailoring" technique for
discovering constitutionally impermissible governmental objectives in

equal protection cases.'0 ' Post and Siegel are right that the "congruence
and proportionality" test readily maps onto the familiar formulation for
"strict scrutiny" review.'0 Certainly, if a statute is "congruent" with a

judicially identified violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, it would
seem that it serves a "compelling" objective. And if a statute is

"proportional" to the rate at which that violation occurs, it would seem
that it is "narrowly tailored" to achieving its remedial objective.' 4
Moreover, when Congress has identified "a history and pattern of
unconstitutional" state activities sufficient to justify prophylactic
legislation,'0 4 it would seem that Congress has made the findings that a
100. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law. Federal
AntidiscriminationLegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441,508 (2000).
101. See id. at 511. Post and Siegel cite JOHN HART ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14543
(1980) for this idea. But it is now familiar in the Supreme Court's decisions. See. e.g.. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining that "the purpose of strict
scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a
goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool").
102. See Post & Siegel, supranote 100, at 477.
103. I don't mean to quarrel with the thesis that "congruence and proportionality" state a single
doctrinal standard. Nor do I think it really matters. After all, the "compelling interest" and
"narrowly tailored means" parts of "upper tier" equal protection doctrine also occupy much the
same space. When the Court insists that it takes a "compelling" interest to justify a racially
discriminatory rule, it is not saying that the general objective or objectives that a state is pursuing
must be especially good. The Court is saying that the state must have an especially goed reaxon for
employing a racially discriminatory means. If it appears that there is some alternative,
nondiscriminatory means available, the state has no "compelling" explanation for its decision to
classify according to race. Then again, the availability of some equally satisfying alternative is also
the question to which the "narrowly tailored means" requirement is addressed. Probably the be-t
way to understand all this is to take the "compelling interest" idea not as a test that the Court brings
to bear on asserted state objectives, but rather as a label the Court places on an interest that really
does explain why only a racially discriminatory rule will suffice. The Court doesn't (really) begin
its analysis asking whether a state interest is "compelling"; it concludes its analbsis by applying the
"compelling" label to an interest that genuinely explains the troubling means the state has seleIted.
104. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955.964 (2001). The fit betveen
the "congruence and proportionality" test in Section 5 cases and the "compelling interest/narrov.,y
tailored means" test in equal protection cases is far from logically perfect. In Garrett, the Court
insisted that Congress had failed to marshal sufficient evidence shoving that the states were
engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination on the basis of physical disabilities. Accordingly,
the Court refused to sustain ADA (which bars state policies that have a disparate impact on the
disabled), which had been defended as a Section 5 remedial means of preventing or discouraging
unconstitutional state discrimination. See id. at 967-68. In Croson, the Court declared that the City
of Richmond had failed to establish a "strong basis in evidence" approaching a "prima facie case"
that the City either had itself practiced unlawful race discrimination or had been a -passive
participant" in unlawful race discrimination by private industry. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 49-,
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state must offer to "define both the scope of [an] injury and the extent of
[a valid race-conscious] remedy."'0' Post and Siegel are also right that an
especially demanding standard of review seems inappropriate in
Section 5 cases. Congress is most unlikely to be concealing an

illegitimate objective that "strict scrutiny" is needed to "flush out." '

I am not inclined to charge the Court with routinely subjecting

Section 5 legislation to the demanding standard of review that the Court
ordinarily reserves for state policies that explicitly discriminate on the
basis of race. If the Court meant to do that, it would employ the very
terms of art it uses in race cases (i.e., the need for "compelling" ends and
"narrowly tailored" means). The choice of different terminology
("congruence and proportionality") may connote a different and, I
should have thought, more generous approach.'" As the Court has
499-500. Accordingly, the Court declined to sustain a local race-conscious set-aside program, which
had been defended as a "benign" remedial device for vindicating the City's compelling interest in
correcting the lingering effects of past discrimination. See id. at 495-96, 511. In point of fact, there
is a way to read Garrett to demand more of Congress than Croson required of Richmond. In
Garrett,the Court faulted Congress for failing to develop an adequate record before enacting ADA.
See Garrett, 121 S. CL at 965. In Croson, the Court arguably would have been satisfied if
Richmond had developed a sufficient record for purposes of defending its race conscious scheme in
litigation. See Justice Department Memorandum on Supreme Court's Adarand Decision from
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to General Counsels 7 (June 28, 1995) (noting this
ambiguity), availableat WL 1995 DLR 125 d33. It is possible to read Garrettto mean that while it
is extremely hard for a city or state to discriminate for the benefit of the members of a racial group
that suffered mistreatment in the past (and thus necessarily to discriminate to the detriment of the
members of other racial groups), it is still easier for a city or state to do that than it is for Congress
to bar state activities not themselves unconstitutional in order to forestall Fourteenth Amendment
violations (even though Congress does not employ race discrimination to do so). I suppose there is a
world view that would accommodate that result, but I doubt that five Justices think that way. The
similarity between the Court's doctrinal formulations in Garrett and Croson seems to me more
beguiling than real. We are witnessing the development of Section 5 analysis on a case-by-caso
basis, and we do not yet know for sure where that analysis is going. Nor, I dare say, do the Justices
themselves. So it would be a mistake to assume that the Court means either to borrow wholesale
from its "strict scrutiny" equal protection cases or, certainly, to assume that the Justices will
ultimately hold Congress to an even higher standard and thus frustrate preventive legislation in
effect, if not in form. In time, Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrettmay capture the single vote needed
to slow this train down or even to turn it around. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 975 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.); cf. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalismfor
the Future,74 S. CAL. L. REv. 523, 533 (2001) (describing the Court's recent sovereign immunity
cases as "more the opening salvos of a battle than the concluding exercises of a war").
105. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510.
106. See Post & Siegel, supranote 100, at 511.
107. So far as I have been able to discover, the Court did not borrow the "congruence" and
"proportionality" nomenclature from any party, amici, or other source, but coined those terms of art
itself. Then again, the terms themselves are fairly commonplace. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (using the term "congruence" to explain that the same
standard of review governs affirmative action schemes established either by the individual states or
by the Federal Government); cf. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 638 (G. Gunther & K. Sullivan
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applied the "congruence and proportionality" analysis, moreover, it has

insisted that its work comports with an important premise in Katzenbach
v. Morgan: "It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much
'
deference. ' Iar
That articulated predisposition to accept congressional

judgment defies any suggestion that the Court considers all Section 5
legislation to be presumptively invalid-which, of course, is the Court's

wont with respect to racially discriminatory laws.' It may be that the
Rehnquist Court is harder to please than was the Court in Morgan."t But
it is too early to conclude that the Court has taken the extreme position

that Post and Siegel identify. Certainly, it is too early to conclude that
the Court means to be so grudging with respect to a federal statute like

section 104, which entails no significant risk to the constitutional values
that lie behind the "congruence and proportionality" formulation.
The "congruence and proportionality" test performs three functions.
First, it maintains the separation of powers."' Any attempt by Congress

to arrive at its own interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment is a
threat to the Court's dominant role in announcing constitutional
eds., 1997) (using "congruence" in a discussion of overinclusive and underinclusive classifications

for equal protection purposes).
108. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966)).
109. According to the standard account, most statutes are presumptively constitutional. See.
e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. That is, most statutes are presumed to serve a legitimate purpose, and
the Court must be persuaded otherwise. Some statutes, by contrast, are presumptively
unconstitutional. They appear to have an impermissible purpose, and the Court must be prsuadzd
that they actually further legitimate ends. The Court's technique in the latter eases is to demand that
presumptively invalid statutes be "narrowly tailored" to achieving a "compelling" land facially
legitimate) objective. When that test is met, the Court is satisfied that the statute is not, after all.
explained by some illicit purpose and, accordingly, that it can be sustained. See City of Clebume v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985).
110. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Morgan relied on the expansive account of
congressional power associated with John Marshall's opinion in MeCullach r. Mat3hand. See
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51 (citing MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
Professor Cox observed that "qualifying phrases like 'reasonable relation' and 'rational' [veJ]
notably absent," replaced by the declaration that the Court would sustain Section 5 legislation if it
could "perceive a basis" on which Congress might "predicate its judgment" that a statute would
secure Fourteenth Amendment rights. Cox, supra note 21, at 104 (insisting that Justice Brennan's
"choice of words cannot have been casual"). Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Ci0 of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511, was conservative by comparison, the majority opinions in Morrison,
Kimel, FloridaPrepaid,and Garretteven more so. That and the result in Garrettled Justice Brayer
to lament that the Court "sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hop:." Garrett,
121 S.Ct. at 975 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. See Post & Siegel, supra note 100, at 513 (distilling these rationales from the Court's
opinions).
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meaning. Second, it preserves federalism. A federal statute that bars
state policies or activities that do not themselves violate the Fourteenth
Amendment substitutes national political judgment for that of the states.

Third, the "congruence and proportionality" test protects individual
constitutional rights. A federal statute that departs from the Court's
account of Fourteenth Amendment rights may deny those rights the full
measure of constitutional protection to which they are entitled and thus
jeopardize the very freedoms that Congress is authorized to enforce.
According to the Court, the notion that Congress may come to its
own conclusions regarding Fourteenth Amendment rights is nothing less

than a challenge to Marbury v. Madison.'2 This is insufficient for
familiar reasons that Post and Siegel elaborate."'

Yet the Court's

112. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Quoting John Marshall directly, the Court has declared that
if Congress had the power to reach its own interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution would no longer be the "'superior paramount law,"' but would be "'on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts .... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it."' City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177). In
this, of course, the Rehnquist Court adopts the very circular reasoning that embarrassed Marshall's
analysis in Marbury. The Court proceeds from the premise that its understanding of the Constitution
is correct and then turns to the effect of a conflicting legislative pronouncement. The Court goes so
far in this direction in City of Boerne as to protest that if Congress were allowed more flexibility
under Section 5, then "[sihifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively
circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V." City of Boerne,
521 U.S. at 529; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 210 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (complaining that congressional power to give Fourteenth Amendment rights a more
expansive interpretation would allow Congress to enact a statute that would "effectively amend the
Constitution").
113. See Post & Siegel, supra note 100, at 525. When the Court itself determines whether a
state policy or activity violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court does not pretend that it
genuinely seeks (far less locates) the very best result, pristine in content and form, unaffected by the
institutional arrangements that produced it. By contrast, the Court readily defers to state officials,
who are not only politically accountable but also may be aware of relevant facts and circumstances
that the Justices cannot glean from an appellate record. The Court's self-restraint typically produces
a holding that the state has not committed a constitutional violation, unless the Justices are
convinced that a violation is clear and, accordingly, that the risk of reaching an erroneous judgment
is minimal. Congress does not labor under the same institutional constraints. Its members are
elected, and its committees can gather the evidence needed for more precise constitutional
calculations. That being so, it would make sense to permit Congress to give Fourteenth Amendment
rights a more expansive scope than would the Court. Certainly, it would be perfectly consistent with
the Court's umpireal role to recognize that, in some instances at least, Congress may have a better
angle on the play. When that is true, the Court can sustain the call that Congress makes, so long as
that call does not compromise the right in question or others that may be implicated. In so doing, the
Court can fulfill its own function to give the Constitution authoritative meaning. See also Michael
W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores, Ill HARV.
L. REV. 153, 155-56 (1997) (offering similar views). Larry Sager pioneered the argument that
institutional considerations cause the Court to give constitutional rights a comparatively narrow
scope. See Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1214-15 (1978). Sager has not abandoned that position and argues
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vigorous defense of its own turf is neither novel nor limited to Section 5
cases. The Rehnquist Court is notorious for insisting that it, and it alone,
is entitled to exercise independent judgment on the meaning of the
Constitution."' I have to think that the Court was moved to declare that
Section 5 statutes must be "congruent" with judicially identified
constitutional principles when the Court faced an unvarnished challenge
to its authority in the first of the recent cases, City of Boerne. It was
perfectly clear that Congress had enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA") in an attempt simply to overrule a
constitutional precedent."' With the benefit of hindsight, it now seems
small wonder that the Court reacted as it did. When Congress respects
the Court's previous articulations of constitutional meaning, the Justices
may be more receptive.
B. The "Congruence and Proportionali" of Section 104
In the case of section 104, Congress can hardly be charged with an
attempt to overturn Supreme Court precedents. The Brad, doctrine may
not firmly establish that a death row prisoner is entitled to test biological
materials for DNA evidence. But no case holds that a state may blithely
deny such a request. Nor does Herreraflatly hold that a demonstration
of actual innocence falls outside the Fourteenth Amendment's purview.
Congress can sensibly probe the various opinions filed in Herrera to
extract the best available indication of what the Justices vll ultimately
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to mean. At this juncture, it is
crucial to recall that most of the Justices expressed a position on the first
proposition that I identified earlier. Five Justices squarely stated that, in
their view, it would be unconstitutional for a state to execute an innocent
person. Whatever doubts there may be with respect to the second and
third propositions, this much, at least, is clear. A demonstration of actual
that it may justify judicial deference to Congress in some Section 5 cases. See ChristophLer L
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Bozme
v. Flores, 1997 Sup. Cr. REv. 79, 94-95. Nevertheless, he largely endorses the Court's anA)lyis and
result in Cio,of Boerne. See id. at 95. 98.
114. Recall in this vein the Court's refusal to perit other courts to decide %%henone of the
Court's constitutional precedents has been eroded and should no longer be followed. See Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477.484 (1989); Hugh Baxter. Managing Legal

Change: The Transfornationof Establishment Clause Law, 46 UCLA L REv. 343. 436. 443-44
(1998) (criticizing Rodriguez de Quijas).
115. The precedent was Employment Division %,.Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Dauglas
Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet. 56 MoNT. L. REv. 145. 153 (1995) (eknovledging

that the point of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was to get right %'hat Srath hlid
contrived to get "v.Tong").
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innocence thus implicates some judicially identified Fourteenth
Amendment violation in the offing-a potential violation that can
warrant at least some form of preventive legislation.
The formal findings listed in section 101 of IPA explicitly treat the
opinions in Herreraas the best evidence of the Court's views."6 Those
findings reflect a genuine attempt by Congress to follow (rather than
lead) the Court regarding the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." 7
Congress appreciates that the square holding in Herrera was that an
"actual innocence" claim usually does not state a Fourteenth
Amendment violation and that ordinary time limits for new-trial motions
generally are valid. By enacting section 104, Congress would make no
effort to supplant an authoritative judicial judgment. Instead, Congress
would act on what most of the Justices themselves recognized in
Herrera-namely, that the Fourteenth Amendment does prohibit the
execution of an innocent person.
Subsection (a) would prevent a state from executing an innocent
death row inmate by ensuring that he or she has the data needed to prove
actual innocence. Subsection (b) would add to that measure of
enforcement only the additional requirement that a prisoner be given a
chance to present his proof to a state court. To be sure, subsection (b)
introduces ideas associated with the second and third propositions I
identified in Herrera-propositions that were not plainly endorsed by a
majority of the Justices in that case. Yet, in the context of prophylactic
legislation, it is not essential either that a demonstration of innocence
after conviction must state a constitutional violation or that a state has a
constitutional obligation to open its courts to such a showing. Even if the
116.

(a) Findings.-Congress makes the following findings:

(13) In Herrera v. Collins ... a majority of the members of the Court suggested that
a persuasive showing of innocence made after trial would render the execution of an
inmate unconstitutional.
(14) It shocks the conscience and offends social standards of fairness and decency to
execute innocent persons or to deny inmates the opportunity to present persuasive
evidence of their innocence.
117. (a) Findings.-Congress makes the following findings:
(15) If biological material is not subjected to DNA testing in appropriate cases, there
is a significant risk that persuasive evidence of innocence will not be detected and,
accordingly, that innocent persons will be unconstitutionally executed.
(16) Given the irremediable constitutional harm that would result from the execution
of an innocent person and the failure of many States to ensure that innocent persons are
not sentenced to death, a Federal statute assuring the availability of DNA testing and a
chance to present the results of testing in court is a congruent and proportional
prophylactic measure to prevent constitutional injuries from occurring.
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Court has left those questions open, Congress can nonetheless enact a
statute that requires a state to make its courts available to powerful post-

trial evidence as a means of ensuring that innocent people are not put to
death by mistake."'

The concern that prophylactic measures may endanger federalism is
real enough. It would not do to permit Congress to enact grossly
overinclusive statutes condemning policies that states are

constitutionally entitled to adopt or activities in which the states are
constitutionally entitled to engage. At some point, Congress would

simply be substituting its own judgment for that of the states with
respect to whole fields of governmental operations. This is not simply to

repeat the thread bare argument that congressional power of that scope
and magnitude would constitute the very police power that Congress
does not enjoy. Even those of us who generally think that federal
legislative power is a good thing can appreciate the problems with
inviting Congress to preempt state labor and environmental legislation in
the name of forestalling violations
of economic due process or the
9
"incorporated" Takings Clause."
118. I should add this reservation: Section 104 should be read to require state to preserne
biological materials long enough to permit DNA testing. It would make little sense to demand that
the states allow testing if they are free to avoid that obligation simply by destroying any material on
hand. The Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), that the Fourteenth
Amendment itself imposes no blanket requirement that evidence be preserved. Prisoners ordinarily
can establish a constitutional violation in an evidence-preservation case only by shov.ing that state
officers acted in "bad faith:' Id. at 58. If section 104 is read to bar the di-posal of materials in -goed
faith," it still is a valid preventive measure in light of other Section 5 precedents. WThen the
Constitution itself is violated only by behavior accompanied by a particular mntal state, Congress
can prevent constitutional violations by enacting statutes that condemn the behavior ithwut proof
of the mental state. In Ciy of Rome, for example, the Court acknowledged that voting regulations
would be unconstitutional only if state officers acted with a "purpose" to frustrate minority voters.
See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980). The Court also recognized that the
Voting Rights Act authorized the Attorney General to disapprove voting rules on the basis of
"discriminatory effect" alone. It is difficult to demonstrate a purposeful mental state. Accordingly.
the Court held that Congress could authorize disapproval of rules with a disproportionate effect
as a
means of preventing the adoption and enforcement of rules with an invalid purpose.True, the Court
disapproved RFRA in City of Boerne in part on the ground that Congress had barred state p olicies
having only the effect, but not the purpose, of punishing religious groups. See City of oeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997). But, again, in that case Congress had plainly attemp:ed to
make burdensome effects the test of a state statute's constitutionality in the first instane,. The
argument that RFRA merely established a federal statutory right did not succeed. Cf. David Cole.
The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boeme v. Flores and CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill
of Rights, 1997 SuP. Cr. REv. 31, 41 (arguing that it should have). If Congress concedzs that only
intentional state conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment and reaches a larger bNdy of state
activity as an authentic prophylactic, there is every reason to think that the Court .%ill
find Ci% of
Rome to be the more persuasive precedent.
119. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 113, at 89-90 (suggesting a -liberty of contrct"
hypothetical); Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection. 72 MtN.*. L
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The "congruence and proportionality" requirement supplies a
limiting principle for keeping Congress within bounds. The best
precedent under this heading may be Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,' 2 in which the Court held that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") cannot be justified on the basis of
Section 5. The Court's decisions establish that age is not an especially
suspicious basis of classification and that the states can use age as a
proxy for "other qualities.' 2' ADEA, on the other hand, bars age
discrimination in most employment situations. It thus outlaws state
policies and activities that are not unconstitutional in themselves to an
extent that is out of proportion to the form of state-sponsored age
discrimination that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
By contrast to ADEA, section 104 would confine itself to the
judicially articulated constitutional evil that Congress seeks to prevent.
Subsection (a) would reach only state refusals to allow DNA testing and,
at that, only refusals to permit testing in circumstances that promise
valuable results. That would cut close to the constitutional bone,
restricting state prerogatives only when a refusal to permit testing would
genuinely threaten the execution of an innocent person. Subsection (b)
similarly would affect only time limits or procedural rules that might
frustrate "actual innocence" showings. Moreover, both subsections (a)
and (b) are also limited to prisoners who are already in custody on the
basis of a state court judgment. Section 104 is not addressed to current
and future prosecutions. This provision in IPA implicitly assumes that
the states are now familiar with DNA evidence, that they have their own
reasons for testing, and that they will not arbitrarily refuse to conduct
tests before trial in pending cases. Section 104 recognizes, however, that
many prisoners were convicted and sentenced before DNA testing
became available and routine. The idea, then, is only to ensure that
prisoners are not foreclosed on the basis of filing deadlines and other
procedural rules enacted at a time when no one anticipated that this kind
of probative scientific evidence might become accessible well after
REV. 311, 343-44 (1987) (suggesting a federal statute protecting equal protection rights in an
economic setting). Congress has considered bills purporting to define what constitutes a "taking" for
constitutional purposes and the compensation that counts as "just." See, e.g., Omnibus Property
Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(a) (1995) (purporting to specify that government
owes an individual "just compensation" whenever its actions diminish the "fair market value" of
property by thirty-three percent); see also Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces
of the Debate Over FederalPropertyRights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 17-18 (1999)
(recalling S.605 and similar bills).
120. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
121. Seeid. at84.
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conviction. Recall, too, that both subsections (a) and (b) restrict their
reach to cases involving applicants under sentence of death.
In both City of Boerne and Kinmel, the Court faulted Congress for
rushing to bar state policies and activities before ascertaining that an
overinclusive

prophylactic

statute

was

needed

to

prevent

unconstitutional state behavior. There was no evidence in City of Boerne
that states often adopt policies that deliberately target religious practices

for penalties. Accordingly, there was no basis for concluding that
Congress needed to ban neutral policies that have the effect of burdening
religious activities as a blunt means of reaching policies that
intentionally discourage religious customs. Nor was there evidence in
Kimel that states often adopt policies that discriminate on the basis of
age in a way that violates the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly,

there was no basis for concluding that Congress needed to ban age
discrimination across the board as a means of reaching policies that
arbitrarily penalize people on the basis of age.'2 In the case of section
104, however, the record is quite different.

More findings listed in section 101 of IPA explain the factual
premises for section 104:'2 DNA testing was unavailable when many
122. There was a better argument in Garrett that states had discriminated on the basis of
disabilities and thus a better case for administering strong medicine in the form of ADA. Yet the
Court emphasized in that case that most of the evidence in the record showed only that states had
failed to take affirmative steps to accommodate disabled pcople-a failure that. %-,hilelamntable,
was not unconstitutional. See Bd.of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. CL 955, 966 e2001 .
Justice Breyer thought the Court was too picky. See id. at 973 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Many of us
would agree. But since the Court in Garrettproceeded from the premise that ADA would have been
justified under Section 5 if more evidence of intentional discrimination had bzen dcveloped. the
holding in that case did not alter the doctrine the Court has developed for Section 5 eases generally.
123. (a) Findings.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Over the past decade, deoxyribonucleic acid testing (referred to in this setion as
"DNA testing") has emerged as the most reliable forensic technique for identifying
criminals when biological material is left at a crime scene.
(2) Because of its scientific precision. DNA testing can, in soma cases. conclusively
establish the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. In other eases, DNA testing may
not conclusively establish guilt or innocence, but may have significant probative %aluz to
a finder of fact.
(3) While DNA testing is increasingly commonplace in pretrial imestigations today.
it was not widely available in cases tried prior to 1994. Moreover, new forensic DNA
testing procedures have made it possible to get results from minute samples that could
not previously be tested, and to obtain more informative and accurate results than earlier
forms of forensic DNA testing could produce. Consequently, in some eases convicted
inmates have been exonerated by new DNA tests after earlier tests had [Isic] failed to
produce definitive results.
(4) Since DNA testing is often feasible on relevant biological material that is
decades old, it can, in some circumstances, prove that a conviction that predated the
development of DNA testing was based upon incorrect factual findings. Uniquely; DNA
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prisoners now on death row were convicted and sentenced. A few states
have enacted statutes making testing available for older cases. But most

states refuse to allow testing in closed cases on the ground that the time
for filing post-trial motions has expired. Time limits may make some
(arguable) sense when applied to newly discovered evidence that has
deteriorated with age. They make no sense at all when applied to DNA
evidence, which remains intact and testable for decades. In this instance,

Congress has done its homework, identified the real likelihood that
states are punishing innocent people, and offered a remedy aimed only at

state behavior that presents potential constitutional difficulty. 24

evidence showing innocence, produced decades after a conviction, provides a more
reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict than any evidence proffered at the original
trial. DNA testing, therefore, can and has resulted [sic] in the post-conviction
exoneration of innocent men and women.
(5) In more than 80 cases in the United States, DNA evidence has led to the
exoneration of innocent men and women who were wrongfully convicted. This number
includes at least 10 individuals sentenced to death, some of whom came within days of
being executed.
(6) In more than a dozen cases, post-conviction DNA testing that has exonerated an
innocent person has also enhanced public safety by providing evidence that led to the
identification of the actual perpetrator.
(8) Under current Federal and State law, it is difficult to obtain post-conviction DNA
testing because of time limits on introducing newly discovered evidence .... In most
States, those motions must be made not later than 2 years after conviction, and
sometimes much sooner. The result is that laws intended to prevent the use of evidence
that has become less reliable over time have been used to preclude the use of DNA
evidence that remains highly reliable even decades after trial.
(10) [O]nly a few States have adopted post-conviction DNA testing procedures, and
some of these procedures are unduly restrictive. Moreover, only a handful of States have
[sic] passed legislation requiring that biological evidence be adequately preserved ....
Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Cong. § 101 (a) (2001).
124. There is no serious argument that relaxing time limits would invite a prisoner to sandbag
state trial courts, foregoing a pre-trial request for DNA testing on the chance that he may be
acquitted and "saving" a DNA testing strategy until after conviction when it is worth the risk that
the results will actually confirm his guilt. Even the short time limits established by most states
permit a motion after a conviction has been obtained. In any case, the cases to which section 104 is
addressed typically were tried before DNA testing was perfected. A prisoner who did not foresee a
rapid technological development of this kind can hardly be charged with manipulation. See State v.
Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 253 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (declining to hold a prisoner
responsible for failing to "anticipate a scientific/judicial revolution" with respect to DNA testing).
The National Institute of Justice treats Thomas and Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct.
1990), as (refreshing) evidence that at least some state courts have acknowledged the genuine need
for conducting DNA tests after conviction and, when necessary, relaxing procedural rules to permit
the results to be examined in court. Unfortunately, too few state courts have followed their lead. See
TRAvis & ASPLEN, supranote 1, at 15-17.
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The concern that Congress may enfeeble Fourteenth Amendment
rights in the guise of enforcement is also real, though not especially
serious in the run of cases. Federal statutes that throw a broad net over

state policies and activities that are not themselves unconstitutional may
place Congress in conflict with the Court and may deprive the states of

authority to adopt programs they think proper. Those consequences of
Section 5 legislation drive the Court's concerns about the separation of
powers and federalism, and, by extension, local self-government. But
Section 5 statutes that condemn state behavior that the Court would

sustain do not ordinarily jeopardize any individual's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. When, for example, ADEA bars age discrimination
that would be valid if examined under the Fourteenth Amendment itself,

no one proposes that anyone's constitutional rights are somehow
compromised. Nobody has a Fourteenth Amendment right to
discriminate on the basis of age in the public employment context.
Still, there are cases in which adjustments in the content of

Fourteenth

Amendment

rights can raise additional

Fourteenth

Amendment problems. Two kinds of cases come to mind. First,

Congress might be more miserly than the Court in its account of
constitutional rights. Take, for example, the so-called Human Life Bill
that was debated in Congress twenty years ago.'2 That bill hoped to
override the Court's holding in Roe v. Wadet"" that a woman has a
Fourteenth Amendment right to terminate a pregnancy prior to

viability. 27 The Court anticipated initiatives like the Human Life Bill in
125. SeeS. 158, 97th Cong. §§ 1-3 (1981).
126. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
127. See generally StBcONZI. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE SENATr. COMM. O TilE
JUDIcIARY, 97TH CONG., THE HUMtAN LFE BiLL S. 158: REPORT ToGmETER WIt ADmo..L
AND MINORITY VtEWs TO THE COMnrTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 6-7 (Comm. Print 1981). Tnzre are
other illustrations. Consider, for example, 1 U.S.C. § 3501, struck down in Dic ersan v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). By all accounts, that statute had been enacted for the purp~z, of
supplanting Mirandar. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. It purported
to discard the Miranda warnings as a necessary prerequisite for admitting confessions in federal
criminal trials and to revive the pre-Miranda rule that voluntary confessions could be introduced.
Inasmuch as § 3501 addressed only federal criminal trials, it did not rest formally on Section 5
power, but rather on congressional authority under Article III to create rules of prozedure for
proceedings in federal court. See Palermo v. United States. 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.ll 1959)
(explaining that Congress can displace nonconstitutional rules established by the Court in the
exercise of its supervisory power). Nevertheless, the attempt to dispatch Mirandaat all raised the
fundamental question whether Congress could make its own determination of the meaning of the
Constitution and insist that that determination should prevail. One can easily imagine a Section 5
version of § 3501 that would purport to supplant Miranda in cases tried in state court. See William
W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the
FourteenthAmendment, 46 DuKE LJ. 291,292-99 (1996) (suggesting a similar Fourth Amzndmnt
hypothetical). The legislative history indicates that the proponents of § 3501 meant to capitalize on
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Katzenbach v. Morgan." Dissenting in that case, Justice Harlan argued
that if Congress had substantive power to depart from the Court's
interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must follow that
Congress was free to make adjustments in either direction. 29 The Court
responded in a famous footnote: Section 5 may empower Congress to
expand the Fourteenth Amendment rights recognized in the Court's
decisions, but does not authorize Congress to "dilute" those rights. 30
The "ratchet theory"' 3 ' in Morgan is problematic. On the one hand,
it seems sensible to say that congressional power to "enforce"
Fourteenth Amendment rights does not equally constitute a power to
weaken them-as judged against standards established by the Court.
Moreover, a power to "enforce" rights does not translate easily into a
power to authorize policies and activities that states may wish to pursue.
On the other hand, there is a certain logic in Harlan's position. The very
idea that Congress can validly disagree with the Court undermines the
notion that the Court's interpretations are formally infallible and thus
establish standards against which congressional judgments must be
measured. If the Court's decisions about the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment are no longer sacrosanct, it is hard to say that an
independent judgment by Congress necessarily compromises a right
simply by giving it a more limited scope.
The Court's recent Section 5 cases defuse the controversy over
Morgan's "ratchet" by declaring that Congress cannot depart from the
Court's account of the Fourteenth Amendment at all. This does not
mean, however, that Congress cannot enact statutes that prevent
constitutional violations. It means that the constitutional violations that
Congress seeks to prevent are violations that the Court would
acknowledge. For present purposes, it is only important to say that
section 104 would pose no risk of diluting anyone's constitutional rights.
Prisoners who would be entitled to DNA testing and an opportunity to
present the results to a state court would enjoy precious little more
the congressional authority recognized in Katzenbach v. Morgan to arrive at an independent
judgment regarding the constitutional requirements that station house confessions must meet. See
Robert A. Burt, Miranda and 7it1e
11:A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 123-26.
When, in Dickerson, the Court held that Miranda announced an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment and that Congress could not supersede that interpretation, the Court cited City of
Boerne. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437.
128. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
129. See id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 646 n.5.
131. Professor Cohen coined this useful metaphor for capturing the idea that Congress can only
enhance, and cannot dilute, Fourteenth Amendment rights. See William Cohen, Congressional
Power to InterpretDue Processand Equal Protection,27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975).
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protection from erroneous execution, but scarcely any less, than the
Justices would recognize as a constitutional mandate.
In a second class of cases, Congress might enact legislation that
enhances one constitutional right, but imperils another. The best
illustration in the books is RFRA, the statute the Court struck down in
City of Boerne.3 2 Congress evidently meant to give individual rights
under the Free Exercise Clause a more expansive interpretation than the
Court had previously allowed. Yet as Christopher Eisgruber and Larry
Sager have explained, RFRA also pressed states to make special
provision for religious groups, which implicated Establishment Clause
concerns.'3 Of course, a federal statute that actually conflicts with the
Fourteenth Amendment (or any other provision of the Constitution) is
scarcely insulated from attack merely because it purports to rest on
Section 5. If RFRA had violated the Establishment Clause on the facts in
City of Boerne, the Court would presumably have struck it down on that
basis.TM Still, constitutional rights need breathing space. The Court
should not have to address and decide a close Establishment Clause
question in order to fault a statute that raises serious Establishment
Clause concerns as the by-product of an overzealous attempt to prevent
violations of the Free Exercise Clause.
There is no possibility that by preventing violations of some
prisoners' rights, section 104 might compromise the rights of others.
There are no other individual constitutional rights in the mix. The only
countervailing value is the desirability of respecting a state's prerogative
to chart a different course, provided that course is not foreclosed
constitutionally. That value, in turn, sounds in concerns about
federalism, not in concerns about the dilution of Fourteenth Amendment
rights againststate authority.

132. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997).
133. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 113, at 98. There are other possible illustrations. It has

been suggested, for example, that a federal statute purporting to change the standard of review for
"benign" race classification cases might affect the equal protection rights of indiiduals %,hoare
denied the benefits

of a race-conscious scheme. See PROCESSES OF CO.SsTt'IrwI
0.%t

DEcisIONMAKMNG: CAsES AND MmATERIAs 498-99 (Paul Brest et al. eds., 4th ed. 20001. Consider as
well that a federal statute purporting to ensure criminal defendants a fair trial by an unbiased jury

might restrict press accounts of the proceedings in violation of the First Amendment. See Cohn.
supra note 131, at 607.
134. Justice Stevens did say that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. See Cil(if Buerne.
521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring). No one else took that position squarely. Then a2ain. no
one else may have thought it was necessary to reach the question. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra
note 113, at 98.
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CONCLUSION

Congress can enact section 104 of the Innocence Protection Act.
The Supreme Court has been surprisingly strict with Section 5 power of
late. Yet the Court's announced doctrinal guidelines for Section 5
legislation, demanding as they are, plainly accommodate a statute of this
kind, enacted to prevent Fourteenth Amendment violations that most of
the Justices have acknowledged.
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